Foreign Fighter Recruitment Messaging and the ‘Islamic State’ by Nelson, Jacob M.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
5-2017 
Foreign Fighter Recruitment Messaging and the ‘Islamic State’ 
Jacob M. Nelson 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nelson, Jacob M., "Foreign Fighter Recruitment Messaging and the ‘Islamic State’" (2017). All Graduate 
Theses and Dissertations. 5695. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/5695 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
 
	
	
FOREIGN FIGHTER RECRUITMENT MESSAGING  
 AND THE ‘ISLAMIC STATE’  
by 
 
Jacob M. Nelson 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
 
of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
in 
 
Political Science 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
 
______________________ ____________________ 
David Goetze Jeannie Johnson 
Major Professor Committee Member 
 
 
 
______________________ ____________________ 
Scott Bates Mark McLellan 
Committee Member Vice President for Research and 
 Dean of the School of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
Logan, Utah 
 
2017 
 
ii 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jacob M. Nelson 2017 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
	
	
ABSTRACT 
  
  
Foreign Fighter Recruitment Messaging and the ‘Islamic State’ 
  
  
by  
  
  
Jacob M. Nelson, Master of Science  
  
Utah State University, 2017 
  
  
Major Professor: Dr. David Goetze  
Department: Political Science  
  
 
  The most current general theory of ‘foreign fighters’ in civil conflicts suggests 
that insurgencies wishing to recruit fighters abroad generally send them propaganda 
messages that predicate their participation on the necessity to defend their common 
transnational identity.  However, this ‘defensive mobilization’ model of foreign fighters 
did not seem to fit well with the Islamic State’s insurgency, as their objectives and 
behavior seemed much more aggressive than defensive, and consequently a ‘defensive 
mobilization’ message in their propaganda seemed unlikely.  My alternative research 
hypothesis was that the Islamic State does not primarily use defensive narratives to 
attract foreign fighter recruits.  Using content analysis of Dabiq, the Islamic State’s 
international recruitment magazine, I found evidence supporting my hypothesis.  Instead 
of using primarily messages of defending a common group, I found that Dabiq 
distributed messages of their religious legitimacy, their religious and military superiority, 
iv 
	
	
the inevitability of their victory, and the Muslim obligation and duty to emigrate and 
support the Islamic State to their potential foreign recruits.  
This research could serve as a signpost for future work to improve our 
understanding of foreign fighter recruitment.  I suggest a possible adjustment to the 
theory of foreign fighters; that individuals can be mobilized to conflicts abroad in any 
message consistent with narratives that serve to not only protect, but also grow and 
strengthen identity, allowing for the possibility for the use of narratives that mobilize 
them to non-defensive violence.  
(61 Pages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
	
	
PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
	
Foreign Fighter Recruitment Messaging and the ‘Islamic State’ 
Jacob M. Nelson 
	
 The so called ‘Islamic State,’ an Islamic extremist organization which currently 
controls large swaths of territory in the Middle East, has attracted foreign fighters to its 
insurgency in tens of thousands.  Until just recently, foreign fighters were not well 
researched or understood separately from local fighters.  David Malet (2013) argues that 
insurgencies recruit foreign fighters by persuading them to defend a ‘common group’ 
against a threatening enemy.  This ‘defensive mobilization,’ he believed, was critical to 
recruiting foreign fighters throughout history.  After preliminary analysis, the Islamic 
State presented evidence contrary to this theory, and it seemed dubious that they would 
use defensive mobilization to recruit foreign fighters.   
 By analyzing at Islamic State’s recruitment propaganda, this research found that 
the Islamic State did indeed break with Malet’s understanding of foreign fighters.  
Interestingly, the Islamic State instead invoked the religious duty to conquer on behalf 
of a legitimate religious state and restore Islamic dominion over the world.  These 
findings may serve to increase our understanding of the Islamic State in general and will 
likely cause us to make adjustments in how we understand foreign fighter recruitment to 
other civil conflicts.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
	
In 2013, David Malet published the first general theory on the recruitment of 
foreign fighters to civil conflicts, asserting that the central propaganda message which 
insurgencies throughout history have used to attract foreign fighters has always been one 
which frames their respective conflict as an existential threat to a shared transnational 
identity, and therefore calls upon their participation to defend their common group.1  My 
research critically examines the validity of this model with regards to the insurgent group 
known as ‘Islamic State.’  Using the content of Dabiq, (the Islamic State’s propaganda 
magazine), I perform both a systematic and interpretive content analysis to identify the 
messages that the Islamic State uses to attract foreign fighters.  My findings show that the 
Islamic State’s central propaganda message is inconsistent with Malet’s model.  Most of 
the Islamic State’s recruitment messages analyzed in my research predicated foreign 
fighter participation on the need to establish an Islamic society or ‘caliphate’ based on 
supposedly uncorrupted tenets of Sharia law.  In contrast, messages framing the conflict 
as ‘self-defense,’ as Malet’s theory would claim, do not play a central role in their 
message campaign.   
 These findings put the validity of Malet’s model of foreign fighters into question, 
and I propose that his theory be altered so that insurgent groups can incorporate the use of 
salient social identities to mobilize foreign fighters for any cause consistent with growing 
																																								 																				
1 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 5. 
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and strengthening their social identity, and need not be just for defensive causes.  In other 
words, while defensive mobilization is certainly a common messaging method for 
attracting foreign fighters, it is possible that expectations associated with identity can 
potentially contain causes of violence that go beyond just self-preservation, and this 
would then be reflected in the messaging propaganda.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY 
 
Malet’s theory is the starting point for my research, and so his work will be 
briefly introduced here.  Restated in his own words, Malet’s central claim in his book, 
Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts, is that “recruiters [of foreign 
fighters] tell potential recruits that their common [group identity] is under existential 
threat and that their participation is necessary for the survival of their people and, 
ultimately, themselves.”2  His conclusion is inferenced from four cases studies of civil 
conflicts involving the presence of foreign fighters; 1) the Texas Revolution (1835-1836), 
2) the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), 3) the Israeli War of Independence (1947-1949), 
and 4) Afghanistan (1978-1992).  For each conflict, Malet used unstructured content 
analysis to identify the dominant recruitment message(s) contained in large collections of 
recruitment propaganda directed at foreign recruits.3 
In constructing his theory, Malet provides a few conceptual definitions.  As the 
fathering scholar in identifying the concept of ‘foreign fighters’ as a singular type of 
phenomenon, he defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join 
insurgencies during civil conflicts.”  He further clarifies that this definition excludes 1) 
militants participating in a foreign state’s military that are ordered into the conflict, 2) 
foreigners who join a foreign state’s military, and 3) employees of private security 
																																								 																				
2 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 5. 
3 Ibid, 11.	
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companies.4  These foreign fighters participate in ‘insurgencies’; a term which includes a 
wide array of scholarly definitions.  Malet preferred to use Kalyvas’s definition, which 
defines insurgency as an “armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign 
entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities.”5  For my 
research, I modify this definition slightly, as a strict interpretation of this definition 
presents a problem in the case of the Islamic State.  Specifically, Kalyvas limits his 
definition to conflicts that have only one common authority within recognized national 
boundaries, and having only two sides to a given conflict (one side being the recognized 
state, and the other, the insurgent group).  In the case of Islamic State, the insurgent group 
fights many authorities, combats other competing insurgent groups like the PKK, the 
FSA or Al-Nusra, and are not limited by national boundaries. Still, the Islamic State’s 
conflict fits very well with the spirit or essence of an insurgency, in that they rebel 
against sovereign authority, and it would be a mistake to discount it from Malet’s model.  
For this study, I interpret the concept of ‘insurgency’ more broadly, as Salehyan does in 
his book Rebels without Borders, to potentially include civil conflicts that expand beyond 
national borders and against multiple groups,6 so that the definition captures the Islamic 
State’s insurgency.   
In his model, insurgencies appeal to transnational social identities to attract 
foreign recruits. He asserts that ‘transnational identity,’ is the principle means by which 
																																								 																				
4 Ibid. 8-9. 
5 Stathis N Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2006). 
6 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).   
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foreign fighters associate themselves with the conflicts abroad.  To define identity, Malet 
relies largely on the work of sociologist George Herbert Mead; stating that ‘identity’ is a 
person’s sense of themselves that they gain through learning the expectations of others 
through social interaction.  Identities give a person a ‘role;’ or expected behavior in the 
context of a socially constructed narrative that they adhere to as member of that group, 
and this role guides all aspects of that person’s behavior.7  They can take on a variety of 
forms, such as family, class, religion, or nationality, and a person can possess a variety of 
these identities all with varying degrees of saliency.  These identities can be attached to 
the nation-state, but are commonly associated with social networks that defy national 
boundaries.  Connor, for instance, notes that identities revolving around national 
citizenship very often are not as immediate and salient as other identities.8  Malet asserts 
that salient transnational identities that feel collectively threatened are tantamount to the 
motivation of foreign fighters to involve themselves in conflicts outside of their state.9   
The concept of identity is already ubiquitous within terrorist literature, and while 
the Islamic State may not meet all the defining features of a terrorist organization,10 their 
ideology and tactics are extremely related to terrorism, both as shoot-off organization 
from Al-Qaeda, as well as a still frequently preferred tactic, especially in attacking the 
‘far enemy,’ but also in other operational stages where conventional military strategy is 
																																								 																				
7 Alain Degenne and Michel Forsé, Introducing social networks (London; Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE, 1999), 6 
8 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 41, 49, 81-82 
9 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 20-24 
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group,” Foreign Affairs, January 14, 
2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group.	
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unlikely to succeed at first.  A 2005 international summit report on terrorism emphasized 
that “collective identity” was key to modeling terrorist behavior and psychology.11  
Monroe and Kriedie also add that identity is important in explaining Islamic 
fundamentalism, and by extension, the Islamic state, stating that “acts which touch on 
personal ethics and politics emanate primarily from one’s sense of self in relation to 
others; this perspective effectively delineates the sets and domain of choice options 
perceived as available to an actor, both in an empirical and moral sense.” Further, they 
later state that “to pursue an action that deviates in any significant regard from [a pre-
given sense of self] necessitates a personal shift in identity that can occur only at great 
psychological costs and upheaval for the actor.”12  
Malet’s theory of defensive mobilization of foreign volunteers broke with the 
previous conventional wisdom that the mobilization of foreign fighters in civil conflicts 
abroad occurs in the same way that local recruits are mobilized.  For these local recruits 
at least, scholars commonly accept Collier and Hoeffler’s13 model to explain mobilization 
of militants, known as the “greed and grievance” model in the civil conflicts literature.   
Recruits are generally assumed to be rational and motivated by either prospect of gain, or 
remediation of some grievance, (or some combination of the two), which overcomes the 
deterrent high risk of personal injury, death, and possible economic hardship associated 
																																								 																				
11 “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and 
Terrorism (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005), http://safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-
on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf.	
12 Kristen Renwick Monroe and Lina Haddad Kreidie, “The Perspective of Islamic 
Fundamentalists and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory,” Political Psychology 18, no. 
1 (March 1, 1997): 19–43. 
13 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95.	
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with their participation.  In other words, these models assume individual net pay-offs for 
participation.  
With foreign fighters, however, Malet asserts that both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ 
explanations for the mobilization of foreign fighters are inadequate. With regard to 
‘grievance,’ he asserts, foreign fighters generally do not have a personal stake in the 
conflict because it occurs outside their state of citizenship.  On the other hand, with 
regard to ‘greed’ explanations, Malet demonstrates that insurgencies do not primarily 
attempt to attract foreign fighters by offering them prospects for enrichment.  Recruiters, 
he observes, almost always warn their potential foreign recruits that their participation 
will bring them minimal if any personal benefit or compensation, and even in the case of 
the Texas Revolution, where recruits were promised large land grants for their 
participation, a majority of recruits did not accept their reward, preferring to return to 
their former homes.  Instead of an economic appeal, Malet observes that the central 
message that recruiters direct at foreign fighters seems to be much more altruistic than 
economic.14  This pattern certainly holds true for the Islamic State as well, where the 
organization specifically requests that foreign fighters not participate for the sake of loot, 
monetary compensation, the prospect for sex slaves, etc.  In fact, the Islamic State warns 
recruits that it cannot guarantee that they can provide any of these benefits at all.  Further, 
the Islamic State tells recruits that ‘martyrdom’ will be the most glorious possible 
outcome to their emigration and waging of jihad.  It’s clear that the Islamic State does not 
assume that fighters will be mobilized by ‘greed’ either.        
																																								 																				
14 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 16-17.  
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 Malet looks to prospect theory to explain why defensive mobilization is so 
effective for foreign fighters.  Prospect theory presumes that collective action can be 
produced through persuading an audience that they will incur greater costs if they do not 
act.  The original developers of prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky, argue that 
people tend to be risk averse with respect to prospective gains and risk-acceptant with 
respect to prospective losses.15 In political science, this theory is often applied to groups 
and assumes that a loss to a group’s collective is felt by all of its members.16  Following 
this line of reasoning, foreign fighters should be willing to assume greater risk to 
themselves on behalf of their group if their group collectively perceive themselves to be 
in the domain of loss.    
Perhaps many people in the Islamic community feel themselves in the domain of 
loss, in the sense that they feel that their identity is threatened.  At the same time, Muslim 
foreign fighters are increasingly being mobilized to fight as insurgents or as part of 
transnational terrorist networks. Data provided by Hegghammer, for example, reveals 
that recent Islamic insurgencies have increased their use of foreign fighters.  Since 1980, 
as many as 30,000 foreign fighters have participated in Islamic insurgencies before the 
Islamic State. He attributes this spike in Muslim foreign fighters to the rise of the Pan-
Islamic identity which began in the 1940s, became militant in the 1980s, and continues to 
reify itself in the present.17  Fuller writes that many Muslims feel that their Islamic 
																																								 																				
15 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1, 1979): 263–91, doi:10.2307/1914185. 
16 Jonathan Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 8, no. 1 (June 2005): 1–21, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104911. 
17 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the 
Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35, no. 3 (2010): 53–94. 
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identity is being oppressed, marginalized, or threatened, and therefore look to a Muslim 
“foreign legion” as an outlet to act on their frustration.18 Heggehammer,19 Fuller,20 
Malet,21 and others like Ranstrop22 seem to see this desire for a pan-Islamic fighting force 
as a defensive reaction to a perceived threat.  For example, Malet cites an account given 
in the will of one of the July 7th, 2005 terrorist bombers in London, in which he states that 
“I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.  
Until we feel security, you will be our targets.”23  However, Malet also stresses that there 
is nothing particular to Islam that makes it more likely to produce foreign fighters.  Any 
salient identity, he asserts, can be mobilized so long as it is able to frame the conflict as 
an existential threat to their relevant group.24  
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
18 Graham E Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, March 2012, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-03-01/future-political-islam. 
19 Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters.” 
20 Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam.” 
21 Malet, Foreign Fighters. 
22 In Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 
Understanding the New Security Environment : Readings & Interpretations (McGraw-
Hill/Dushkin, 2004). 125-140. 
23 “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005” 
(London: House of Commons, 2006), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/10
87.pdf. 
24 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 25. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT 
	
This section examines what the Islamic State organization is, what its objectives 
are, how it came into existence, how it attempts to attract foreign recruits, and the 
conditions that gave rise to this conflict.  Throughout this discussion, we observe that 
transnational identity was important both for initiating the conflict as well as for 
attracting foreign fighters to the Islamic State.  We also observe that the Islamic State is 
different from Al-Qaeda and other insurgencies, in that their objectives are seemingly 
less defensive and reactionary, and more instigating and aggressive.   
The Islamic State traces its ancestry to the Jordanian born terrorist Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi. Zarqawi was born in Jordan, and those who knew him in his youth described 
him as a bully, thug, heavy drinker, bootlegger, and even a pimp;25 and was arrested 
several times in his youth for drug-dealing and shoplifting among other things.26 As he 
became an adult, he joined Tablighi Jamaat, a non-violent Islamic spiritual self-help 
organization, in an effort to turn himself away from his former life of crime.  He had only 
been with this group for a few months when, in 1989, he was recruited into the 
Afghanistan insurgency against the Soviet Union, just as the Soviets were pulling out of 
																																								 																				
25 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” The 
Atlantic, August 2006, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-
violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/. 
26 Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda 
(New York: Other Press, 2005). 
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the region.  Still, he trained and participated in the aftermath infighting of jihadists, 
creating connections and earning respect with other insurgents along the way.27   
One of the important connections made was to Sheikh Abu Muhammad al 
Maqdisi, an important religious writer who championed a creed of opposing and 
overthrowing any government who does not enforce strict interpretations of Sharia law. 
According to a study performed by the Combatting Terrorism Center of the United States 
Military Academy, Maqidsi “is the key contemporary ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual 
universe.”28  Maqdisi would become Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor and friend, and their 
relationship would influence Zarqawi’s thinking profoundly, and by consequence, the 
eventual ideological makeup of the Islamic State.  They later returned to Jordan together 
and orchestrated several botched terrorist attacks against the government and that 
eventually led to their arrest.29   
After his eventual release from prison, Zarqawi went to Herat, Afghanistan to 
start his terrorist group aimed at overthrowing the Jordanian government.  Zarqawi 
inspired a following of recruits through an ideology characterized by anti-Shia and anti-
state objectives and tying it to a Sunni Muslim identity.30  While establishing his 
organization, his relationship with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was 
somewhat antagonistic and mired by differences of ideology and personality.  As Stern 
																																								 																				
27 Jessica Stern and J. M Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Ecco Press, 2015).  
28 William Mcants, “Militant Ideology Atlas” (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism 
Center, U.S. Military Academy, November 2006), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf. 
29 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 15.	
30 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State” (New York (N.Y.): The Soufan Group, November 
2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-
Nov14.pdf, 11. 
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and Berger describe it, “Bin Laden and his early followers were mostly members of an 
intellectual, educated elite, while Zarqawi was a barely educated ruffian with an 
attitude”31 Later, Stern and Berger explain that Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda saw themselves as 
a sort of ‘vanguard’ elite acting to protect and defend the global Muslim Ummah, while 
Zarqawi and later the ‘Islamic State’ had much more positive objectives.32  Weaver also 
writes that from the beginning, Zarqawi openly disrespected and criticized Osama Bin 
Laden’s leadership and ideology, complaining that bin Laden was too focused on the ‘far 
enemy,’ killed fellow Muslims by fighting the Northern Alliance, opposed the targeted 
killing of Shias, and altogether was not serious enough about engaging in jihad.  
However, Osama Bin Laden conceded his presence and operations in Afghanistan, and 
also gave money to sponsor his organization. It wasn’t until the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan that Zarqawi worked together with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to repel U.S. 
forces.  Wounded from a U.S. airstrike, Zarqawi fled Afghanistan and into Iranian and 
Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002, where he joined Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish jihadist 
organization.33   
During Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq where Zarqawi had travelled, minority 
Sunni Muslims were favored while the majority group of Iraqi Shia’s were badly 
persecuted and denied political rights, especially after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  
This persecution polarized Sunni and Shia identities away from each other, and would 
play a role in the insurgency and religious politics that followed the U.S. invasion.  
																																								 																				
31 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 16. 
32 Ibid, 53-74 
33 Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.” 
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Shortly after 9/11, the Bush administration believed that Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and was collaborating with Al-Qaeda (in fact, citing 
Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq as evidence of their collaboration).  The U.S. invaded Iraq 
expecting that peaceful democracy would follow easily after Saddam was deposed from 
power.  The reality was that sectarian tension and Sunni opposition to U.S. forces 
(especially the 100,000 Sunni Ba’athists removed from power) made peaceful democracy 
much more difficult than the Bush administration had planned.  Zarqawi was very much a 
part of the chaos that ensued. Anticipating the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he decided to set up 
terrorist sleeper cells before the invasion, and by August 2003, his terrorists had already 
launched three major attacks in Iraq, 1) against the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, 2) the 
United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, and 3) Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, a 
particularly important Shia Shrine.34  
Despite the tension that had existed previously between Zarqawi and Osama bin 
Laden, Zarqawi eventually pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2004, and his group was 
rebranded as ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQI). His group served as Al-Qaeda’s official branch in 
Iraq for the next ten years, but their alliance was more of a marriage of convenience than 
ideological agreement.  The tension between the two would continue, and Zarqawi 
frequently disregarded the advice and warnings of Al-Qaeda’s leadership.35  In any case, 
																																								 																				
34 Barrett, “The Islamic State,” 11.	
35 Aaron Zelin, “The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global 
Jihadist Movement,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, no. 20 
(June 2014), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pd
f. 
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the international attention Zarqawi raised as part of AQI began attracting foreign fighters 
in large numbers.   
Zarqawi was later killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006 and was succeeded by Abu 
Hamza al Muhajir, who soon thereafter merged his organization with other local terrorist 
groups and renamed and reorganized themselves as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ (ISI), 
headed by Abu Omar al Baghdadi (not to be confused with Abu Bakr al Baghdadi).36   
The creation of the Islamic State of Iraq marked the beginning of the insurgent group’s 
new strategy; that of conquering and controlling territory.  They first attempted to seize 
territory in Iraq’s rural Anbar province, an area mostly populated by Sunni tribes.  
However, their first attempts at governing the region were disastrous.  The Islamic State 
of Iraq’s extremely harsh implementations of Sharia law in Anbar led to hostile responses 
from the local Sunni tribes along with other Sunni militant organizations elsewhere in 
Iraq.  As a result, this led to the consolidation of a strong Sunni-led counter-insurgency 
movement known as the “Sahwat” (Awakening),37 which involved at least 90,000 Sunni 
volunteers.38  By 2010, the combined military efforts of the Awakening, the U.S. 
military, and the Iraqi Security forces degraded and all but destroyed the Islamic State of 
Iraq,39 killing both Muhajir and Baghdadi in the process.40  
																																								 																				
36 Barrett, “The Islamic State,” 11-12. 
37 Zelin, “The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist 
Movement,” 3 
38 “Opinion: Who’s to Blame for Iraq Crisis - CNN.com,” accessed March 20, 2016, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/12/opinion/pregent-harvey-northern-iraq-
collapse/?c=&page=0. 
39 Barrett, “The Islamic State,” 12. 
40 “Al Qaeda’s Two Top Iraq Leaders Killed in Raid,” Reuters, April 19, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda-idUSTRE63I3CL20100419.	
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Abu Bakr al Baghdadi subsequently succeeded the previous Baghdadi in May of 
2010 and began to rebuild the insurgency.41  Baghdadi is said to have been a quiet 
individual with a strong background in Islamic jurisprudence, and radicalized himself 
only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  U.S. forces captured him with a group of other 
insurgents, and sent to Camp Bucca, a military detention facility.  There, he met with 
several high and low profile jihadists and members of the former Ba’athist party 
associated with Saddam regime.  These ties helped Abu Bakr to reinvigorate the Islamic 
State organization with jihadists and military expertise.  When he was released, he called 
up a friend involved with al-Qaeda, who connected him with the Islamic State of Iraq’s 
official spokesman, and joined the organization, then under the leadership of Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi.  Since academically trained religious scholars were rare to jihadist 
organizations, they quickly sent him to Syria to evade American capture, and was tasked 
to ensure the group’s propaganda was consistent with their conservative brand of Islam, 
an experience for Baghdadi which likely played a large role in the successful 
development and reach of the late Islamic State’s slick propaganda campaign.42 After 
assuming command of the Islamic State of Iraq, he reorganized the organization’s senior 
leadership with new personnel, many of them having spent several years with Baghdadi 
																																								 																				
41 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders,” At War Blog, May 16, 
2010, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-
leaders/. 
42 William McCants, “The Believer: How Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Became Leader of the 
Islamic State,” The Brookings Institution, September 15, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever. 
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in Camp Bucca, among them former Ba’athists who provided the Islamic State of Iraq  
with much needed military expertise.43  
With the U.S. forces slowly withdrawing after the surge, the Islamic State of Iraq 
was able to spring back to life again under Baghdadi and began assassinating leaders of 
the Awakening, significantly weakening the Sunni led counter-insurgency.  Between 
2009 and 2013, at least 1,345 members of the Awakening had been killed by the Islamic 
State.44  The democratic Iraqi government led by Maliki also did little to stop the 
campaign against the Awakening, probably pleased with the fact that the Islamic State 
was eliminating powerful Sunni leaders and third party military which might oppose 
them,45 which weakened the Sunni identity’s counter-narrative championed by the 
Awakening. Baghdadi also attacked Iraq regime targets through a vicious campaign of 
car bombs and other suicide bombings.  The state of security gradually weakened until 
the city of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, was captured by the Islamic State mid-2014, 
which consolidated the Islamic State’s control over much of northern Iraq.  Local Sunnis, 
embittered by their years of abused rights and representation in the new Iraqi 
government, were this time hesitant to respond to the Islamic State’s series of military 
victories.  While not wanting to live under the Islamic State, many Sunnis believe they 
																																								 																				
43 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 33-29. 
44 “War, Interrupted, Part I: The Roots of the Jihadist Resurgence in Iraq,” War on the 
Rocks, November 5, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-interrupted-part-i-the-
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45 Tim Arango, “Iraqi Sunnis Frustrated as Awakening Loses Clout,” The New York 
Times, May 3, 2010, 
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enjoy more rights under the caliphate than under the Shia majority government in 
Baghdad.46  
Next door in Syria, a civil war triggered by the Arab Spring erupted in Syria 
against the government’s military dictatorship led by Bashar al Assad, which provided 
new opportunities for the Islamic State of Iraq.  Protests against corruption, inequality, 
and government injustice lead to the replacing of several former rulers throughout the 
Arab world, and these successful protests inspired discontented citizens in Syria to follow 
suit.  Instead of stepping down, however, Bashar al Assad decided instead to shoot at 
protestors and crack down on those opposing the regime through capture, torture, and 
execution.  Assad’s action angered the Syrian population and civil war ensued.47  Over 
time, the insurgent militants organized themselves into several rebel factions, each with a 
different vision for changing Syria.  Notable among these groups are the Free Syrian 
Army, which represented Syria’s liberal democratic interests, as well as Jabhat Al-Nusra, 
which represented Al-Qaeda.48   
In April of 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio message announcing a 
merger between the Islamic State and Al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. This was 
shortly followed by an Al-Qaeda ruling that no such merger had occurred.  Al-Baghdadi 
subsequently rejected Al-Qaeda’s ruling, and began recruiting members from Al-Nusra 
into the Islamic State of Iraq which led Al-Qaeda to officially disavow themselves from 
																																								 																				
46 David Ignatius, “How ISIS Spread in the Middle East,” The Atlantic, October 29, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-
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47 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 39-40. 
48 “Who’s Who in the Syrian Civil War | Clarion Project,” ClarionProject.org, May 7, 
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their organization in February of 2014.  The merging of much of Al-Nusra to the Islamic 
State made it the most powerful insurgent in the region, and began rapidly amassing and 
controlling territory. Following these massive territorial gains in both Iraq and Syria, the 
Islamic State of Iraq was renamed as “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” (ISIS) in 
June of 2014.  At this time, they also declared the revival of the ‘caliphate;’ a symbolic 
gesture which as Barrett writes, “…was intended as a rallying call to all observant 
Muslims, but in particular those who shared the salafist/takfiri views expressed by The 
Islamic State, and so draw away support from like-minded groups in Syria, including al 
Nusra, that might compete for recruits and resources.”49 
The declaration of the caliphate and massive territory grabs eventually began to 
attract foreign fighters to the organization in higher numbers than ever before.   However, 
as shown previously, the strategy of attracting foreign fighters has always been central to 
the Islamic State’s success and strategy.  A quantitative analysis performed by Ruevan 
Paz in 2005 showed that in a sample of 154 Arabs killed in the conflict of Iraq during a 6-
month period (primarily from Zarqawi’s group), only 8 percent of those killed were local 
Iraqis, and the rest were foreign fighters with the majority (61%) from Saudi Arabia, and 
the rest from a variety of mostly Arab countries.50  As the Islamic State stands now, 
foreign fighters continue to flood to the organization in relatively large numbers.  The 
most recent published assessment, by “The Soufan Group” (TSG) in December of 2015, 
																																								 																				
49 Barrett, “The Islamic State.” 
50 Reuven Paz, “Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq:  An Analysis,” PRISM, Series of Global 
Jihad, March 2005, No. 1/3.	
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estimates that somewhere between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters have joined the 
Islamic State or other organizations in Syria from at least 86 countries since 2011.51   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
51 “Foreign Fighters:  An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria 
and Iraq” (The Soufan Group, December 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
	
 Based on our understanding of the conflict there is at least some initial reason to 
suspect that the Islamic State does not behave in ways that Malet’s ‘defensive 
mobilization’ model expects.  We know that the Islamic State is committed to restoring a 
caliphate in the Levant governed by 7th century interpretations of Sharia Law.  They also 
set about ‘purging’ Islam of apostasy, which includes killing many fellow Sunni Muslims 
along with Shias who do not subscribe to their ideology, instead of focusing on direct, 
more obvious threats to their identity.  They commit genocide against defenseless 
Yezidis.  It becomes challenging to explain all this behavior as defensive.  A first glance 
at these objectives suggests that the Islamic State is primarily positive and ideological 
rather than reactive or defensive, and one would assume that these objectives would carry 
over into the messages directed toward potential foreign fighter recruits, contradicting 
Malet’s model.  A simpler explanation would be that the Islamic State is not trying to 
defend a transnational identity at all, and does not frame the conflict to their potential 
foreign fighters as such either. 
 I hypothesize that the Islamic State does not frame the conflict to potential foreign 
fighters as one which threatens their transnational identity as Muslims, as Malet’s theory 
would expect.  As an alternative hypothesis, I suggest that the Islamic State instead 
frames the conflict as one predicated on the religious duty to support the creation of 
government stipulated by a 7th century interpretation of political Islam and Sharia law, 
which in this case, gives foreign fighters the duty to go on the offensive. In this, I suggest 
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that while it is likely that most insurgencies frame their respective conflicts to potential 
foreign fighters as predicated on the defense of some perceived common group, the 
mobilization to violence within a common identity can be predicated on anything 
consistent with their identity’s narrative, not just its self-preservation. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYZING THE PROPAGANDA 
	
To test my hypothesis, I analyze a sample of Islamic State propaganda content 
directed at their potential foreign recruits.  To my knowledge, Aaron Zelin is the only 
other scholar to have also used content analysis of Islamic State propaganda material in 
any similar systematic fashion. However, his analysis did not discriminate between 
material directed at foreign or local recruits and material from the rest of the Islamic 
State’s entire information campaign. Zelin’s analysis of a sample of one week’s worth of 
propaganda (including reports, radio streams, notices, and videos) from April 18- April 
24, 2015 demonstrates that Islamic State propaganda generally revolves around six 
topics; military, governance, da’wa (preaching), hisba (justice by Sharia law), promotion 
of the caliphate, and enemy attack.  Recurrent themes emerge in which followers are 
portrayed “as winners, competent, and pious, while it casts its enemies as unjust and 
unbelievers.”52  He describes the content of these six topics as follows: 
 
• Military:  The Islamic State portrays itself as “always on the march,” showing that 
there is constant progress and frequent success in battle.  The nature of words is 
almost always offensive, rather than defensive.  In referencing its enemies, the 
Islamic State uses derogatory language (such as Rafidah (for Shias), Crusaders, 
																																								 																				
52 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s 
Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445.	
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apostates, disbelievers, atheists, etc.), which serves to delegitimize the enemy but 
also to portray the Islamic State as true believers and representatives of the 
Muslim Ummah (community).  Of the 123 media releases in Zelin’s sample, 
nearly half of the releases were on this particular topic.     
• Governance, Promoting the Islamic Caliphate, and Hisbah:  Propaganda 
materials demonstrate the normalcy of life under the territory that it controls, and 
how the caliphate provides social services and infrastructure.  They also 
demonstrate the principles of creating the good society which it tries to promote, 
and how it enforces Sharia law principles through strict moral policing activities. 
• Da’wah: The Islamic State appears to use its propaganda to persuade Muslims to 
accept its own interpretation of Islam, and that the only true path for a Muslim is 
with the Islamic State.   
• Enemy Attack:  In some propaganda messages, the Islamic State reports on the 
enemy’s attacks against “ordinary Muslims” and against the Islamic State’s 
infrastructure.  It frames the enemy as destructive and unjust, and that opponents 
of the Islamic State want to prevent Muslims from ever living in a prosperous 
society.  This last category of topics is consistent with Malet’s “self-defense” 
theme discussed earlier.  However, only 9 of the 123 media releases collected by 
Zelin focused on this theme.   
Hear, we observe that propaganda framing the conflict as a threat to a 
transnational identity is almost absent from Islamic State propaganda analyzed by Zelin.  
My analysis will differ somewhat from his to address this question of foreign fighters and 
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defensive mobilization more directly.  While the Islamic State produces large quantities 
of propaganda material on a weekly basis, the published issues of Dabiq, the Islamic 
State’s international propaganda magazine, was chosen as the propaganda content sample 
for my analysis.  There are a few reasons for this: 
1. The content of Dabiq is most likely written for a foreign audience.  Each issue of 
Dabiq is translated from Arabic to English, French, German, Russian, and other 
European languages.  The target audience is potential foreign recruits, rather than 
locals or those already recruited within the organization (with notable exceptions, 
which I mention later). 
2. Dabiq is long-form propaganda content.  Unlike twitter messages and most of its 
video productions, Dabiq is at liberty to elaborate extensively on their propaganda 
message, thereby giving greater leverage for analysis.   
3. Dabiq consists of official propaganda media produced directly from the Al Hayat 
Media Center, (the Islamic State’s propaganda organization).  Other propaganda 
messages are often produced within their “wilayat” or local geographic areas, and 
often are released anonymously on twitter and other social media, making it 
difficult to ascertain whether the content originated from the core of their 
organization or not.    
 
As of March of 2016, the Islamic State has produced 13 issues of its magazine 
over a two-year period.  The magazine began printing shortly after the Islamic State 
declared a caliphate and conquered Mosul.  Table 1 outlines the date, title, and number of 
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pages of each issue of the magazine.  Only issues 2 through 13 were used in the sample.  
Issue 1 was used to test different configurations of this analysis, and so was removed 
from the final sample to prevent any bias in the final results.  It is a rare opportunity to be 
able to analyze an entire population of content for analysis (with the exception of future 
issues) as I do here, and this increases the reliability that the results are a true 
representation of Dabiq.  
 
 
Table 1: Issue Summary of Dabiq 
 
			
			
	
Following content analysis methods outlined by Lombard, Duch, and Bracken,53 I 
analyzed Dabiq attempting to identify ‘recruitment messages’ used to determine whether 
																																								 																				
53 Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-Duch, and Cheryl Campanella Bracken, “Content 
Analysis in Mass Communication: Assessment and Reporting of Intercoder Reliability.,” 
Human Communication Research 28, no. 4 (2002): 587–604. 
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the Islamic State principally frames the foreign fighter participation as one predicated on 
group defense or not.  Focusing on ‘recruitment messages’ has an advantage over 
identifying discussion topics or more general themes as Zelin does.  I define this term as 
a message, obvious or subtle, used for persuading foreign recruits to join their fight.  The 
analysis attempts to quantify how often specific, predetermined recruitment messages 
occur in throughout Dabiq.  
To develop an index of possible recruitment messages to look for, a general 
application of Grounded Theory to identify and classify different categories of 
recruitment messages was applied.   Through abroad preliminary analysis of Islamic State 
propaganda videos and the first issue of Dabiq approximately four distinct recruitment 
messages were classified.  Remarkably, these four indices were different from the 
‘conventional wisdom’ in the news cycle attempting to   I came up with eight possible 
recruitment messages to look for in my sample.  Each recruitment message was assigned 
a number, a title label, and a small descriptive explanation, as follows: 
1. Superior and Victorious- Islam (as practiced by the Islamic State) is superior and 
will be inevitably victorious in conquering their enemies.   
2. Utopianism- The Islamic State is a unique utopia for faithful Muslims.   
3. A New World System- The Islamic State is attempting to replace western 
civilization with a political system centered on Islam.   
4. Religious Duty- Obedience and submission to Allah is tantamount for salvation, 
requiring participation in the Islamic State.  
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5. Legitimacy- The Islamic State’s practices follow the pure tenets of Islam, and is 
(alone) justified in its actions.   
6. Muslim Defense- Muslims have been oppressed and/or existentially threatened, 
and the Islamic State fights to defend Muslims.   
7. Thrill, Excitement, Adventure- Participating in the Islamic State’s violence and 
other activities is an exciting, thrilling, and/or fulfilling experience.  
8. Restoring Pride- The Islamic State is rescuing the Muslims from their former 
humiliation and restoring pride to Islam.   
Additionally, for content that did not employ any of these recruitment messages, or that 
clearly did not direct their content at foreign fighters, codes 9 and 10 were used: 
9. None apply- None of these themes apply very well, or there was no identifiable 
theme. 
10. Not applicable target audience- The target audience was clearly not potential 
foreign fighters.      
It could be argued that these indices are not exclusive or specific enough to be 
conclusive.  For instance, does content emphasizing the Islamic State’s legitimacy really 
play into a larger theme of defense (of legitimately defending their identity)?  These 
possibilities are considered, and it represents one of the reasons why interpretive analysis 
must necessarily accompany the structured one, which I discuss in the section “Results,” 
to interpret what the content really represents.  However, even if this were the case, a 
refutation of Malet’s theory only requires that defensive narrative, or any other narrative, 
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to be explicit.  To qualify for each index of recruitment messages, the content’s intentions 
must clearly indicate for the given recruitment message more than any other.    
Using these recruitment messages, I carefully reviewed the content of every 
section or article of Dabiq chronologically, and identified the most dominant recruitment 
messages for every page of that section as given above.  Both text and images were 
considered content of that page.  For issues two and three (comprising of 86 pages or 
about 12% of the sample), a second nonprofessional coder was used to simply determine 
the inter-coder reliability of my content analysis.  According to Lombard et al, a .80 inter-
coder reliability statistic is a fairly moderate risk-criterion for determining reliability, and 
which I adopted.  After analyzing issues two and three of Dabiq, the inter-coder 
reliability was calculated to be .79, with seemingly no pattern in the disagreements. 
While this reliability measurement falls just short of a .80 benchmark, I believe it is 
sufficiently close enough to .80 to proceed with the assumption of reliability.   
After all of the pages of all the sections of Dabiq were coded, the results were 
summed together to find which recruitment messages were most frequent.  In particular, I 
looked to find out how often Dabiq employed a “Muslim Defense” message in 
comparison to others.  If Malet’s theory is correct, we would expect this recruitment 
message to turn up significantly more often than all others.  After the count data is taken, 
some interpretation of the content is then used together to illustrate what the overall 
message that the Islamic State is sending to attempt recruiting foreign fighters. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RESULTS 
	
As illustrated in figure 1, the results of my analysis revealed that “Legitimacy” 
was the most frequently dominant recruitment message, followed closely behind by 
“Superior and Victorious.” This data also reveals that the “Muslim Defense” recruitment 
message does not occur as frequently as we might expect, and is well behind the first two 
in frequency.   
The actual distribution of recruitment messages varies across all issues of Dabiq, 
as demonstrated in Figure 2.  Some issues have a distinctive “slant,” or central message, 
that biases individual issues toward a specific recruitment message.  For example, in 
issue 5 titled “Remaining and Expanding” we see that almost the entire article was found 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Recruitment Messages in Dabiq 
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to have a “Superior and Victorious” message, which makes sense given its title.  In this 
particular issue, the Islamic State elaborates to its readers on the progress of their 
conquests and the inevitability of their victory.  In another example, we can observe that 
in issue 3 titled “A Call to Hijrah,” emphasizes the “Obedience and Submission” 
message.  Here, the Islamic State stresses that obedience and submission to God requires 
that they perform Hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, expounding on the doctrine 
along the way.  
When looking only at the distribution of recruitment messages, we only get a 
partial picture of the messages the Islamic State is sending to its recruits.  A brief 
interpretive summary of the content is necessary to get an in-depth glance at the Islamic 
State’s recruitment efforts.  By its own description, the name of the magazine for 
Dabiq… “…is taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab 
(Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of 
the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the 
greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq.”54 
What follows is a descriptive summary of how each recruitment message was 
used in Dabiq. 
 
Legitimacy: 
																																								 																				
54 Dabiq Issue 1, 4  
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Figure 2: Distribution of Recruitment Messages Per Issue of Dabiq 
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In Dabiq, both the structured content analysis and interpretive analysis revealed 
that religious legitimacy is very important to how the Islamic State attempts to attract 
recruits.  The Islamic State portrays itself in Dabiq as justified in its actions and the only 
religiously legitimate actor, even among other jihadist organizations.  Surprisingly, the 
Islamic State makes frequent attacks against Al-Qaeda and its Syrian affiliate al-Nusra at 
least as much as it makes attacks the west, describing their current leadership as corrupt, 
stalling, and unwilling to do what is required, such as reacting to the necessity of purging 
Muslims (killing all Shias and fighting the Sunni “Awakening” and other ‘apostates’ 
claiming to be Muslim), and establishing a Caliphate based on a stricter interpretation of 
Sharia law.  The Islamic State holds that Osama bin Laden is a true Immah (leader) and 
that his Al-Qaeda laid the groundwork by which Zarqawi could begin the caliphate 
project, but Al Qaeda has since been corrupted by apostasy.   
 One particular instance of written assault on Al-Nusra found in Dabiq is the 
performance of “Mubalah,” a religious debate referred to in Islamic Scripture used to 
settle religious differences.  Dabiq reports how the debate proceeded between Al-Qaeda 
and Al-Nusra.  Their account of the event attempts to demonstrate how the Islamic State 
was the clear victor, and observed that the Islamic State is conquering with greater power 
than Al-Nusra, this being a sign of God’s intervention. 
 As another example, issues 8-12 contain a series of articles titled “The Allies of 
Al-Qaeda” which continue to focus its attack on the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda and other 
33 
	
 
	
Islamic rebel organizations in Syria.  In particular, they are quick to point out that Al-
Qaeda’s affiliates have allied with the enemies of God for the sake of fighting the Islamic 
State and Bashar Al-Assad.  In one such article, an author writes; 
 
   
The questions that every follower of the jihād claimants should ask are: Why did 
the leadership of the Jawlānī front [another name for Al-Nusra] ally with these 
factions against the Islamic State? What is the ruling of those who entered into 
different operations rooms and alliances with these and worse factions against the 
Islamic State? What is the ruling of those who have cooperated and coordinated 
with these and worse factions against the Islamic State? Why do these factions 
publically make blatant statements of jāhilī [ignorant] nationalism – many of their 
statements being kufr [acts of disbelief]– yet the Jawlānī front continues to ignore 
these mistakes and not denounce them publically (sometimes even defending 
them!) and instead focuses its media campaign against the Islamic State? Are the 
mistakes of the nationalists insignificant compared to the supposed “mistakes” of 
the Islamic State!55 
 
 
 
The Islamic State therefore portrays itself as the only rightful organization to 
franchise jihad, and explicitly deposes of Al-Qaeda of that right.  The likely reasons for 
this; to deter foreign recruits (potential and already participating) away from Al-Qaeda’s 
various branches and to instead join the Islamic State. This is important because it reveals 
a special target audience of those already interested in performing jihad.   
Dabiq also attempts to legitimize the Islamic State through scripture and doctrinal 
interpretations.  Using scripture, long articles often expound on 1) the necessity for 
Muslim’s to establish the Islamic State, 2) the true nature of Sharia law and the need to 
enforce it, and 3) the necessity to purge Islam of Shia’s and other apostates (such as the 
‘Sahwat’ Awakening).  They frequently attempt to demonstrate that the Islamic State 
																																								 																				
55 Dabiq 8, 11 
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follows and enforces the pure tenets of Islam as revealed by the prophet Muhammad, and 
are religiously justified in their actions.  As an example, a Dabiq author writes the 
following after discussing several scriptures justifying the practice of enslaving Yezidis: 
 
Before Shaytān [Satan] reveals his doubts to the weak-minded and weak hearted, 
one should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffār [disbelievers] and 
taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Sharī’ah 
that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of 
the Qur’ān and the narrations of the Prophet…and thereby apostatizing from 
Islam.56  
   
 
 
As Dabiq uses interpretations of doctrine to legitimize its actions, one can assume that 
they attempt to reach out to fundamentalist Muslims, even those already radicalized 
among other groups and organizations.   
This interpretative analysis reinforces the results of the structured content analysis 
in that religious legitimacy plays a huge role in the Islamic State’s recruitment efforts.  
The insurgent organization goes to extensive lengths to convince its foreign recruits that 
it is the long awaited, God-sanctioned authority to direct the affairs of faithful Muslims.  
Even when Dabiq used other recruitment messages, legitimacy was usually at least 
implicit in the content.    
 
Superior and Victorious: 
 
																																								 																				
56 Dabiq 4, 17 
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 The “Superior and Victorious” message was also extremely important to the 
Islamic State.  Dabiq frequently portrays the Islamic State as the only party that wields 
the sanction and power of God.  With this power, they are then able to make continual 
advances and are successfully expanding and holding territory.  These messages are 
demonstrated in at least two ways.  First, Dabiq frequently talks about their military 
success, either in defending previously held territory, or in taking new territory from their 
enemies.  A Dabiq writer discusses holding the conquered city of Kobani in northern 
Syria: 
 
The Americans claimed that this city wasn’t a major focus for them, yet the bulk 
of the airstrikes that they’ve conducted across Iraq and Shām have been directed 
against the mujāhidīn fighting in ‘Ayn al-Islām [another name for Kobani], 
leading them to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a fruitless endeavor that 
will only serve to delay the inevitable. In spite of the heavy bombardment and the 
mounting numbers of shuhadā’ [martyrs], the mujahidin have refused to retreat. 
They continue to remain firm, having confidence in Allah’s promise of victory for 
those who fight in His path.57   
 
 
Second, Dabiq writers use prophecies, history, and doctrine to foretell their own victory.  
By referencing the Syrian town of Dabiq in the title of its magazine, it links the theme of 
this magazine to a prophesied final Armageddon battle in which a Muslim army defeats 
an army of Christians (the West).  Altogether, the Islamic State portrays itself as 
unstoppable, a group of fighters armed with the power of God, ever victorious, patient, 
unyielding, confident, and determined.  Implicitly, using this recruitment message also 
serve the theme of legitimacy.  Just as the ancient Islamic empire made many converts by 
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demonstrating its battle success and conquests, so these insurgents likewise try to use 
their victories as evidence that God is behind their army, and has promised them victory, 
even in resisting and defeating the powerful coalition forming to defeat them.   
   
Obedience and Submission: 
 
  In Dabiq, frequent calls are made for potential recruits to repent and submit to the 
will of God, which by the Islamic State’s logic, requires their allegiance and participation 
in the Islamic State.  Pages using this theme also often include promises of forgiveness 
from sin through repentance (through joining the Islamic State), and stern warnings to 
those who delay or refuse repentance.  An example in Dabiq is an excerpt of a speech 
made by Baghdadi himself: 
 
We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), 
and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, 
and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different 
specializations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their 
emigration is wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the 
dire need of the Muslims for them. People are ignorant of their religion and they 
thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it.58     
   
 
 
 While perhaps occurring less frequently than other recruitment messages, this is 
the logical message that follows their message of legitimacy.  They frame themselves as a 
legitimate authority over the worldwide community of faithful Muslims, and as a result, 
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all are required to obey God and emigrate to and support the Islamic State, or else be 
condemned as apostates and killed by the Islamic State, or at the very least, incur the 
judgement of God in the after-life.  
  
Muslim Defense: 
 
 Throughout Dabiq, the enemy is framed as evil, disbelieving, weak, out of favor 
with God, and trembling to the power of the Islamic State.  However, in fewer instances 
Dabiq writers frame their enemies as aggressors or instigators of the conflict, as we might 
expect from Malet.  Still, references in Dabiq allude to the West’s constant interference 
in Muslim lands as a contributing motive to fight and participate with the Islamic State.  
They portray the enemy as never allowing Muslims to construct their caliphate and 
establish Sharia law, and attacks against the Islamic State are framed as attacks against 
Muslim interests.  Articles justifying the many executions they perform are usually 
framed as killings of retribution against their victim’s host countries, for not yielding 
their airstrikes against ‘Muslims’ (against targets of Islamic State).  Issue 7 of Dabiq, for 
instance, justifies their decision to burn a captured Jordanian pilot alive:   
 
In burning the crusader pilot alive and burying him under a pile of debris, the 
Islamic State carried out a just form of retaliation for his involvement in the 
crusader bombing campaign which continues to result in the killing of countless 
Muslims who, as a result of these airstrikes, are burned alive and buried under 
mountains of debris. This is not to even mention those Muslims – men, women, 
and children – who survive the airstrikes and are left injured and disabled, and in 
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many cases suffering from severe burns that cause them pain and anguish every 
minute of every day.59 
 
 
 
However, this message of group defense was hardly the most dominant 
recruitment message across issues of Dabiq. In most instances, Dabiq framed their 
enemies as illegitimate leaders of the world due to their disbelief and their corrupt nature, 
and not necessarily threats.  The Islamic State is also often framed as a safe haven from 
living in corrupt or sinful societies.   
 
New World System: 
 
This recruitment message attempted to find the instances where Dabiq framed the 
Islamic State as replacing western nationalism, democracy, or other political systems 
with one that is centered on Islam.  The analysis found some infrequent instances of this 
recruitment message, especially in later issues. The term “nationalist” was also very 
frequently used as a derogatory term for many of their enemies, so this message was 
somewhat involved in the Islamic State’s overall recruitment message, if only implicitly.  
Usually this recruitment message was not coded due to its brevity on the page, and 
worked as a subtheme to the greater theme of legitimacy.  A notable exception to this are 
explanations of the Islamic State’s use of the gold “dinar,” the Islamic State’s own 
minted currency:   
 
																																								 																				
59 Dabiq 7, 6 
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In an effort to disentangle the Ummah [global Muslim community] from the 
corrupt, interest-based global financial system, the Islamic State recently 
announced the minting of new currency based on the intrinsic values of gold, 
silver, and copper. This initiative is a significant step towards shifting the Ummah 
away from the usage of currencies that are no longer backed by any precious 
metals, and whose values are constantly manipulated by the central banks of their 
respective nations.60 
   
 
 
No Applicable Recruitment Message / Not Target Audience: 
 
 There were several instances where either the page did not have a dominant 
recruitment message (even in context), or the coding scheme did not capture the 
recruitment message adequately.  Most of the time, the situation was the former, where 
the page did not have an identifiable theme.  For example, Dabiq will often announce 
their new video productions on a page without description, in which case there was no 
way to derive a message out of those particular pages. Very occasionally, and more so in 
later issues, an essay directed at those already recruited, giving them advice and 
instructions, is also included in Dabiq.   
 
Other Recruitment Messages: 
 
The other recruitment messages, such as “Restoring Pride,” “Utopianism,” and 
“Thrill, Excitement and Adventure” only turned up occasionally in Dabiq and are outlier 
messages in the sample.  It is significant that these recruitment messages were coded so 
																																								 																				
60 Dabiq 5, 18 
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little in Dabia, because it contradicts popular explanations for Islamic radicalization and 
the Islamic State among scholars and the media.  For instance, Ferrero cites that Islamic 
radicalization is a reaction to failure and humiliation of Islamic society in general,61 
which would fit in with a “Restoring Pride” appeal.  Another example comes from 
Washington Post Journalist Terrace McCoy, in which he states that the Islamic State 
recruits are motivated by the prospect for adventure and thrill, calling it a “Call of Duty” 
allure.62  While all of these causes may still describe the motivation of these recruits, the 
analysis shows that the Islamic State does not emphasize these motivations to attract 
foreign fighters. 
Altogether, both a structured and interpretive analysis of Dabiq reveals that the 
Islamic State does not attract recruits by primarily framing the conflict as predicated on 
the defense of the Muslim community, and instead emphasizes legitimacy, military and 
religious superiority over the world, and the necessity to support the Islamic State out of 
religious duty.  This finding supports my research hypothesis that Malet’s model for 
defensive mobilization of foreign fighters does not apply to the Islamic State, and instead 
employs other recruitment messages to attract foreign recruits.  The fact that asserting its 
legitimacy is the most important recruitment message says something about the Islamic 
State’s recruitment efforts.  It serves to signal Islamic fundamentalists and extremists to 
come serve a long awaited religious authority to finally establish Sharia law in society to 
																																								 																				
61 Mario Ferrero, “Radicalization as a Reaction to Failure: An Economic Model of 
Islamic Extremism,” Public Choice 122, no. 1/2 (January 1, 2005): 199–220. 
62 Terrence McCoy, “The Islamic State’s ‘Call of Duty’ Allure,” The Washington Post, 
October 28, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/10/28/the-islamic-states-call-of-duty-allure/. 
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its true extent, and assert Islamic power and might over the world.  Such a message is 
inconsistent with the ‘defensive mobilization’ model of recruiting foreign fighters. 
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CHAPTER VII 
WHAT MAKES THE ISLAMIC STATE SO DIFFERENT? 
	
As mentioned previously, jihadist terrorist and insurgent group recruitment have 
traditionally employed defensive narratives.  The results show, however, that the Islamic 
State may be adopting an “offensive jihad,” as opposed to a defensive one.  Whether this 
represents a long-term shift in jihadist attitudes or a short-lived experiment in new 
recruitment strategies is still unclear.  But the analysis makes clear that the Islamic State 
is qualitatively different from not only from most insurgencies, but also from most all 
jihadist organizations, including al-Qaeda.    
The conclusion that the Islamic State does not employ messages of group defense 
to attract foreign fighters happens to be consistent with a very recent work published by 
Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger.  They assert that one of the fundamental differences 
between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State is that Al-Qaeda’s message is defensive, while 
the Islamic State is not.  They write that the Islamic State’s messaging strategy shifted 
away from Al-Qaeda with the publication of the video production The Clanging of 
Swords, Part 2.   
 
[This propaganda video] had…subtly dropped a key element of al Qaeda 
propaganda.  In many ways, al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategy were explicitly 
predicated on assumption of weakness.  In its worldview and favored ideological 
justifications, jihad was an act of defense, or at least that was the line they sold to 
the world.  Self-defense was easier to rationalize—and sell—than an improbable 
vision of global domination.  So al Qaeda’s recruitment materials and fund-raising 
activities brimmed over with talk of “the plight of Muslims,” steeped in pathos.  
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According to al Qaeda’s ideologues, this urgent and existential danger was the 
entire reason for the organization’s existence.63   
Why does the Islamic State recruit foreign fighters so differently from other 
insurgencies?  Noah Feldmen, writing a little less than a decade before the advent of the 
Islamic State, argued that the idea of ‘Islamic statehood’ has been slowly more popular 
among practicing Muslims since the idea of a caliphate was abolished by Turkey in 1924, 
and after traditional Islamic Statehood collapsed.  Islam, unlike other world-wide 
religions, is both a way of life as well as a way to govern, and there are significant 
numbers of devout Muslims who desire to return to a religious way of running 
government.  This is evident in the creation of states like Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose 
leaders gain political legitimacy by claiming to be “Islamic,” who allege to organize their 
societies according to the rules and norms stipulated by Islam and Sharia law.  Further 
evident is the increasing number of people using democratic institutions to vote for laws 
that follow the Sharia.   
 What happened, according to Feldmen, is that Islamic Statehood, as practiced by 
the Ottoman Empire, ultimately failed and fell under the weight of its backward looking 
views.  Muslims looked to western styled political ideologies, like nationalism, 
secularism, fascism, democracy, socialism, and the like to replace their outmoded forms 
of statehood.  However, their western experiment, tried for nearly a century for some, has 
likewise failed, and so a return to the conservative principles of Sharia and Islamic 
Statehood embedded in culture and religious tradition seems more prudent.64   
																																								 																				
63 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 108. 
64 Noah Feldmen, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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Of course, this is not to say that those who aspire to establish Islamic Sharia as a 
way to govern and establish society are attracted to the likes of the Islamic State, but it is 
conceivable that the Islamic State represents a viable realization of many Muslim’s 
aspirations for Islamic Statehood.  Such a narrative is consistent with the fact that the 
Islamic State expends most of its efforts in its recruitment messaging to support their 
legitimacy and their perceived strength and viability, religiously correct, and not co-opted 
by western ideas.  Feldmen writes, “The Islamists’ aims are both religious and worldly. 
To be sure, they seek to follow God’s will.  But they also explicitly say that they want to 
restore just government to the countries in which they live.”65  Likewise, Maha Azzam 
writes “the modern state…is perceived by Islamists, both moderate and radical, as having 
failed to deliver, in so far as it has left peoples and polities economically backward, 
politically weak, and subject to unjust government.”66 This is not to say that Islamists 
insurgencies generally recruit on the promise of rebuilding Islamic Statehood.  Indeed, it 
seems apparent that many jihadist recruiters have framed their conflicts as predicated on 
the defense of the global Muslim community.67 Perhaps, what the Islamic State represents 
is an experimental change of recruitment and overall strategy for Islamic insurgencies.   
If aspirations for Islamic statehood based on Sharia law are indeed well embedded 
in the identities of significant numbers of faithful Muslims, then the Islamic State’s 
messages of its legitimacy and ability to create one demonstrates the viability of 
recruiting foreign fighters based on any narratives consistent with the growing and 
																																								 																				
65 Ibid, 3. 
66 Maha Azzam, “Islamism Revisited,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 82, no. 6 (2006): 1119–32. 
67 Malet, Foreign Fighters. 24-25 
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strengthening identity.  While it is common (and probably easier most of the time) to 
predicate foreign fighter participation on the defense of their transnational identity, other 
recruitment messages are shown to be sometimes viable as well, depending on the target 
transnational identity from which they recruit.   
Even with this explanation, a puzzle remains.  The narrative employed by the 
Islamic State in Dabiq is an especially religious one, but the majority of recruits to the 
Islamic State are not usually very religious before joining the Islamic State.68 Why would 
the Islamic State employ deeply religious narratives to establish Islamic legitimacy and 
call upon recruits’ religious duty, if the majority of recruits are at best only moderately 
religious?  There must be an intervening variable that explains this disconnect.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
68 Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa,” 
Program on Extremism, George Washington University, December 2015. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
  
Malet asserted that insurgent groups who attempt to attract foreign fighters do so 
by framing their participation as predicated on the defense of their common group or 
identity, and that they do not attract foreign recruits on the basis of the prospect for gain.  
The analysis of Dabiq, from a variety of quantitative and interpretive approaches, 
provides evidence consistent with the view that, in its recruitment efforts, the Islamic 
State does not appeal to a prospect for material gain or recovery of personal grievance, 
nor does it attempt to mobilize foreign recruits on the basis of creating a common 
defense.  This also distinguishes it from Al-Qaeda’s brand of jihad, which traditionally 
predicated participation on the defense of the global Muslim community.   
 Instead, the Islamic State taps into the demand for a caliphate prevalent 
throughout the global Muslim community, especially among Islamic fundamentalists and 
Islamic extremists already radicalized. Identity is still important to the Islamic State, but 
identity is shown to mobilize individuals based on non-defensive narratives.  This is 
evident in the type of message the Islamic State is pitching to recruits and the target 
audience, and is consistent with the observed fact that Islamic statehood is already a 
popular notion with many members of the Islamic community.   
 This conclusion moves the scant literature on foreign fighters in a new direction.  
We know that insurgencies attempt to attract foreign fighters on ideological narratives 
and altruistic motives connected to salient social identities, but recruitment messaging 
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need not be limited to narratives and motives related to the defense of their common 
identity.  Recruitment messages can use identity to arouse foreign fighters to nationalism 
and nation-building.  However, more research needs to be performed to explore the limits 
of identity in mobilizing causes to violence with respect to foreign fighters.   
 The results of this research also guides foreign policy in the region.  I suggest here 
that the Islamic State is qualitatively different from other Islamic extremist insurgencies 
and terrorist organizations that frame the United States as leading a Western-led 
onslaught against Muslims, and instead is moving jihad in a whole new narrative 
direction.  Whether this will be part of a broader trend in the future or not is still unclear, 
but fighting the Islamic State will require not just engaging in peaceful dialogue with 
Muslims nations and individuals, but also of delegitimizing the Islamic State and its 
ideology.   
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